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In the 1992 United States Senate election, Utah continued its strong trend toward 
conservatism.  Since the 1960s, Utahns identified themselves predominantly with the 
Republican Party.  This ideological transformation occurred in conjunction with a 
significant population shift from urban areas to suburban communities, growing 
conservative strongholds in Utah politics.  Traditional urban versus rural tension 
continued, but a decrease in rural residents limited its importance, particularly in general 
elections.  With Utahns joining the conservative movement in large numbers, Republican 
Bob Bennett, a candidate with no previous elected experience, easily defeated four-term 
Democratic Congressman Wayne Owens in the 1992 U.S. Senate election.  The most 
competitive contest in this race occurred in the Republican primary rather than the 
general election, a trend demonstrating the increasingly conservative nature of the state.  
Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints were key to potential 
change.  They constituted two-thirds of the state’s population in 1992.  These were the 
rank and file of the conservative movement in the state.  As Mormons turned to social 
conservatives and settled into homogenous suburbs, Republicans gained an electoral 
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BEEHIVE OF CONSERVATISM 
 
 
In the 1992 presidential election, Democrat Bill Clinton finished in third place 
only in Utah.  Both Republican George H.W. Bush and third-party candidate Ross Perot 
bested the eventual winner there.  Such a poor showing—less than 24 percent of Utah’s 
popular vote—led observers to expect an electoral bloodbath for other Democrats in the 
state.  In part, that prediction came true.  Democratic gubernatorial candidate Stewart 
Hansen fared worse than Clinton, winning just 23 percent of the vote while also finishing 
third.  However in the same election cycle, Democrats won two of Utah’s three 
congressional seats, and Democrat Jan Graham was elected attorney general in the 
party’s only statewide victory.1 
Unique circumstances influenced each of these Democratic victories.  Bill Orton’s 
re-election in the overwhelmingly conservative Third Congressional District surprised 
experts.  A weak challenger and his own conservative voting record propelled Democrat 
Orton to victory.  Democrat Karen Shepherd outlasted Republican Enid Greene in the 
more moderate Second Congressional District.  As the state’s solicitor general, Jan 
Graham held significantly higher name recognition than her 34-year old opponent Scott 
Burns in the attorney general’s race.  Republican Burns’ only experience came from his 
time as a rural prosecutor in southern Utah.  He attempted to bring rural voters to his 
candidacy only to alienate many urban and suburban voters in the process.  While she !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Utah Office of the Lieutenant Governor, 1992 General Election Results, (Salt Lake City, 1992). 
Republican George H.W. Bush won the state with 41 percent of the vote followed by Independent Ross 




won the race by only 5,000 votes, Graham’s margin of victory in densely populated Salt 
Lake County was 46,000.  In a race less concerned with ideology than legal experience, 
Graham outpaced Burns to become the last Democrat to win statewide office in Utah.  
Despite such Democratic gains, the state remained firmly in GOP control with 
Republican Governor Mike Leavitt easily defeating Democrat Stewart Hansen and 
Republicans nearly doubling their Democratic colleagues in the state legislature.2 
Dissecting the long-term political implications of the 1992 elections is difficult 
amid such electoral variance.  Yet, if the results in 1992 were diverse, a pattern emerges 
that reflects the long-term shift of the state to the political right.  While each election 
cycle of the late twentieth century saw conservatism strengthen in Utah, Democrats were 
still competitive for state and federal office.  In 1992, Utah Democrats fielded their 
party’s strongest candidate in an open U.S. Senate race only to see him soundly trounced.  
The crushing, 16 percent defeat of four-term Representative Wayne Owens in a highly 
anticipated contest signaled the final stage of Democratic viability in U.S. Senate races. 
Since that contest, Republicans have easily won every Senate election in the state by an 
average of 30 percent over their Democratic challengers.  A study of this Democratic last 
stand offers insight not only into the rise of conservatism but the fall of liberalism in 
Utah.  Here also is apparent the interplay of local and national events along with the 
importance of style and political image in effecting outcomes.3 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!Utah Office of the Lieutenant Governor, 1992 General Election Results, (Salt Lake City, 1992).!
3 Utah Office of the Lieutenant Governor, 1992 General Election Results.  The terms of Owens were non-




In 1963, a New York Times article called Texas a “Two-Fisted, Three-Party 
State.”4  Widely considered to be a one-party state, the article showed the dominant 
Democratic Party split between competing liberal and moderate factions.  Each competed 
for control of government with the Republican Party playing a minority role in state 
politics.  Such a title could be appropriated for Utah in the late twentieth century.  
Democrats stood in a marginal position in state politics as the two larger factions of the 
Grand Old Party (GOP) fought over who controlled the party and ultimately state 
government and federal office.  The 1992 Senate primary vote illustrated this.  With a 
primary record 49 percent of the state’s registered voters casting ballots, Republican 
candidates Bob Bennett and Joe Cannon received 135,514 and 128,125 votes 
respectively.  The Democratic primary was hotly contested, yet its two candidates only 
received a combined 120,746 votes, less than either GOP challenger.  Republican 
conservative contenders wielded two fists in the state’s political system.  The Democratic 
Party contributed to the political environment, but it played a tertiary role to these two 
factions of conservatism. 
Discussions of Utah politics inevitably concern the Mormon religion, Utah’s 
predominant faith.  With 59 percent of its members identifying themselves as 
conservatives, the Mormon Church outpaces other religious groups in the state and 
country with its conservatism.  By comparison, only eight percent of Mormons self-
identify as liberals.  The four major candidates in 1992, Joe Cannon, Bob Bennett, Doug 
Anderson, and Wayne Owens were active members of the Mormon Church.  Of the four, 
Owens had held the highest-ranking position in the church hierarchy, spending three !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




years as a mission president in Canada between elections to the House of 
Representatives.  Yet because of his political affiliation as a Democrat, Owens 
continually faced questions about his Mormon faith.  A 1974 poll revealed that 70 
percent of Utahns thought he belonged to another church.  The religious divide is 
palpable in Utah society and politics.  Few issues escape religious identity and meaning.  
Voters weigh candidates not only by their messages but with a sensitivity to religious 
affiliation and level of commitment.5   
With this as background, the 1992 U.S. Senate race emerges as a valuable case 
study to assess political trends in Utah.  Going beyond newspapers and other public 
sources, this thesis examines campaign materials, particularly those of Bob Bennett’s 
staff, still unavailable to researchers.  Supplementary to this are interviews with several 
key players in that election.  Government records, including census reports, illuminate 
important demographic shifts in Utah that shaped political change.  Utilizing internal 
memos and strategic documents from Bennett’s personal collection, we get an insider’s 
glimpse of the workings of a statewide political campaign.  
Building on these primary and secondary sources, this thesis seeks to consider the 
1992 Senate race in the context of demographic change and a growing conservative 
movement.  Key to this analysis is the political career of Wayne Owens.  The 
transformation of the political environment can be measured in Owens’ runs for the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Frank Newport, “Mormons Most Conservative Major Religious Group in U.S.” Gallup Poll (11 January 
2010).  Accessed 23 February 2011; John Sillito and Bill Slaughter, “An Interview with Wayne Owens.” 
Sunstone 5, no. 4 (July 1980), 59.  Owens won election to the House of Representatives in 1972 but vacated 
this office to run for an open seat in 1974 against Republican Jake Garn.  After losing that election, the 
Mormon Church asked him to oversee its missionary program in Montreal, Canada from 1975 to 1978.  In 




Senate in 1974 and 1992 which bookend the period.  His failures put into bold relief the 







THIS IS THE “RIGHT” PLACE 
 
 
 Throughout much of the twentieth century, Utah followed national political 
trends.  Between 1916 and 1972, Utah voters supported the eventual presidential winner 
in 15 of 16 elections.  Despite this apparent shadowing of national politics, Utah’s 
political dial began turning to the right during the latter half of the twentieth century.  The 
last time a Democrat outperformed the national popular vote was Harry Truman in 1948 
when Utah delivered him a nine percent victory, doubling the national average.  Since 
that time, Utah has always voted more conservatively than the national average in its 
presidential elections.  Even in the 1964 election when Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson 
defeated Republican Barry Goldwater, the state delivered a 13 percent smaller margin of 
victory for Johnson.  Figure 1 shows the difference in popular vote between the national 
average and Utah.  With a few aberrations, the results demonstrate a state growing further 
apart politically from the rest of the nation.    
A series of master’s theses have surveyed social and political change in Utah 
since the 1960s.  James Seaman’s important study of twentieth-century Utah politics, 
“Critical Campaign: Republicans, Democrats and the 1964 Election in Utah,” examines 
Johnson’s successful presidential campaign.  No Democratic candidate has won 40 
percent of the popular vote in the state since his victory.  Despite growing concerns with 






Figure 1. Utah Presidential Vote Compared to National Average 
(Percent More Republican) 
 
personality, particularly through a close relationship with Mormon President David O. 
McKay.  If Democratic candidates wanted to win in Utah, their best hope was to follow 
Johnson’s example, overcoming party differences with personality.  More importantly, a 
Democrat could win if voters felt the Republican opponent was outside the mainstream, 
as many viewed Barry Goldwater in 1964.  Jay Rogers’ thesis “Utah’s Right Turn, 
Republican Ascendance and the 1976 U.S. Senate Race,” examines this watershed 
election cycle as incumbent Democrat Frank Moss suffered defeat to Republican Orrin 
Hatch.  No Democrat has won the office since.  Both theses document the decline of 
Utah’s Democratic Party.1 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Jay Logan Rogers, “Utah’s Right Turn: Republican Ascendancy and the 1976 U.S. Senate Race” 
(Master’s thesis, University of Utah, 2008); James Seaman, “Critical Campaign: Republicans, Democrats 















 Explaining Utah’s growing political conservatism brings multiple factors into 
play.  An event that significantly changed the state’s political outlook occurred during the 
cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.  Following the 1973 Supreme Court Roe v. 
Wade decision, the issue of abortion became a litmus test for many conservative voters.  
Given Utah’s strong religious atmosphere, the issue took on great weight among voters.  
Candidates rarely mentioned abortion in the 1992 U.S. Senate race because all of them, 
Democrats and Republicans, adopted a pro-life stance.2 
Gay activism also gave conservatives additional momentum.  Charles Perry’s 
thesis, “Let He Who Is Without Sin Cast the First Orange,” examines the movement in 
Salt Lake City, Utah.  While small and isolated, these activists alarmed enough Utahns to 
help create a backlash of conservatism among voters.  Kelley Page Heuston’s thesis, 
“Homosexuality and the Fight for Legal Rights in Utah” analyzes the movement’s 
legislative and legal battles in a hostile environment.  As states across the country passed 
hate crimes legislation, Utah lawmakers adopted a bill in 1992 that focused on religion 
and race while conspicuously ignoring homosexuality.3 
While other intermountain states have shifted back into competitive two-party 
systems, conservatives continue to dominate Utah politics.  Historian Dean May in his 
1987 study Utah: A People’s History offered a broader perspective.  While conceding a 
major shift toward conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s, May questioned the permanence 
of this move to the right.  None of these studies has attempted to correlate ideological 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!For additional information on the cultural revolution see:  Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great 
Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics, (New York: The Free Press, 2001).!
3 Charles Perry, “Let He Who Is Without Sin Cast the First Orange: Anita Bryant and the Making of a Gay 
Rights Movement in Salt Lake City” (Master’s thesis, University of Utah, 2008); Kelley Page Heuston, 




change with demographic analysis and thus measure the grassroots nature of conservative 
power.4  
Two Brigham Young University political science professors, David Magleby and 
H.E. “Bud” Scruggs, conducted the only significant research on Utah’s 1992 election. 
Their groundbreaking study focused entirely on the caucus-convention system, a process 
often ignored when discussing Utah political history.  They compiled data on caucus 
attendees and delegates, giving important insights into candidates’ convention strategies.  
This thesis expands on their findings to include analysis of the primary and general 
elections.  The diverse sources available to the author construct a much sharper picture of 
the 1992 election and allow it to be seen in broader ideological and demographic 
contexts. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!








THREE MILLIONAIRES AND A CONGRESSMAN 
 
 
 U.S. Senator Jake Garn shocked many political insiders when he chose not to run 
for reelection in 1992.  Most aspiring candidates had turned their attention to the open 
gubernatorial contest, but with a rare Senate seat now open, many flocked to the race.  
Geneva Steel CEO Joe Cannon became the first GOP candidate to declare his candidacy.  
Others, including business executive Bob Bennett, soon joined the contest. 1  
Many voters recognized Cannon’s name because of his reputation for business 
success.  When the state’s major steel plant threatened to shut down, Cannon had 
orchestrated an unexpected takeover.  With more than a thousand Utahns employed at the 
plant, the resurrected steel company drew state and national praise.  Just as important, 
Cannon connected himself to the Utah political establishment with hefty campaign 
contributions.  In 1990, he donated more money to political candidates than any person in 
the state, a move clearly designed to curry favor for his business from governmental 
elites.  It also positioned him for a political run.  Cannon rode his business success into 
the role of the favorite in the open U.S. Senate race.2 
Son of former U.S. Senator Wallace Bennett, Bob Bennett was no stranger to 
Utah politics.  He ran his father’s last two U.S. Senate campaigns in 1962 and 1968.  In 
addition, he spent several years employed as the head of Congressional Relations in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Bob Bernick Jr., “Cannon Sets Sights on Succeeding Garn in D.C.,” Deseret News, 22 July 1991. 
2 Bob Bernick, Jr., “Geneva Chief Was Top Contributor to Utah Politicians,” Deseret News, 15 November 





Department of Transportation, a political appointment under President Richard Nixon.  
Despite these connections and the 24 years that his father spent as a senator, most Utahns 
had never heard of the junior Bennett.  “The state changed a lot during those 18 years, 
and political memories are pretty short,” said Greg Hopkins, Bennett’s assistant 
campaign manager and former director of the state Republican Party.3  Despite recent 
success as the CEO of a major Salt Lake City business, Bennett remained unknown to 
most Utahns.  His only foray into Utah politics was a largely unpublicized 1990 run for a 
nonpartisan state school board seat, a race he narrowly lost to the sister of U.S. Senator 
Orrin Hatch.4  Other Republicans entered the Senate race, but the personal financial 
fortunes of Cannon and Bennett clearly set them apart from the rest.   
On the Democratic side, Wayne Owens faced an intraparty challenge from 
businessman and former Harvard Business School Professor Doug Anderson. Owens 
grew up in the rural town of Panguitch in southern Utah.  He graduated from the 
University of Utah with both undergraduate and law degrees.  Actively engaged in 
politics at an early age, Owens became the western states coordinator for the 1968 Robert 
Kennedy presidential campaign.  He spent the next five years as a staffer for Senators 
Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Frank Moss of Utah.  Following this, the 35-year 
old Owens won a seat in the House of Representatives, his first run for public office.5 
A fifth-generation Utahn, Anderson completed two degrees from Utah State 
University in his hometown of Logan, Utah.  Like the other challengers, Anderson was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Greg Hopkins, interview by author, 7 April 2011, Salt Lake City.  Hopkins worked on the Bennett 
campaign after the convention and through the general election.  Before this, he served as the campaign 
manager for Republican candidate Ted Stewart.  He was appointed Bennett’s first chief of staff in 1993.   
4 Peter Scarlet, “Two New Faces Join State School Board,” Salt Lake Tribune, 8 November 1990. 
5 Jay M. Haymond, “Douglas Wayne Owens,” in Utah History Encyclopedia, ed. Allan Kent Powell (Salt 





Mormon and served for two years as a missionary in Europe.  He spent most of his 
professional life on the East Coast, working at the Harvard Business School, U.S. 
Treasury Department, and as a Capitol Hill aide.   In addition to a strong resumé in 
business and government, Anderson brought a sizeable personal fortune to the campaign.  
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DELEGATES: UTAH’S POLITICAL ELITES 
 
 
Utah’s caucus-convention system vested significant power in state delegates to 
select party nominees.  While the majority of states select candidates through a direct 
primary, Utah operates a lesser-known and more complex process of party caucuses and 
state conventions.  In 1992, only seven other states utilized caucus-convention systems. 
Other states held symbolic conventions with straw polls and similar devices to gauge 
candidate support, but Utah’s caucus-convention system controlled a candidate’s access 
to the ballot.  
Each candidate knew that the first step toward winning an election began in the 
spring with the selection of delegates in neighborhood caucuses.  In 1992, Republicans 
and Democrats gathered on April 27 in small community assemblies to elect state 
delegates to their respective party conventions.  Approximately 1,500 of these 
community meetings were held across the state in political units called precincts.  These 
districts were small, comprising an average of 500 registered voters per unit.  Depending 
on local party rules, caucuses could be held at public buildings or in the home of a 
precinct member.  Turnout at the 1992 neighborhood caucuses varied greatly.  Sometimes 
only one or two voters attended while other gatherings included well over a hundred 
participants.  Occasionally, no one came to a precinct meeting and the local party 




at the party caucuses would win the nomination outright.  If no candidate reached that 
threshold, the top two vote getters would face off in a September primary election.1   
Delegates are not required to pledge themselves to a particular candidate at the 
caucus meeting.  This differs from the country’s most well-known caucus system in Iowa 
where delegates are required to vote for their meeting’s preferred presidential candidates.  
The BYU study of 1992 neighborhood caucus meetings revealed that most delegates did 
not commit to any particular politician.  Occasionally individual precincts asked 
delegates to support specific candidates during the caucus meeting, but the state 
convention granted each delegate a secret ballot.  In a 1992 poll, 20 percent of 
Republican caucus attendees reported that delegates committed to a candidate during 
their precinct’s meeting.  In comparison, only nine percent of Republican delegates said 
that they had committed to a candidate at their caucus.  Democratic attendees and 
delegates reported no such disparities.  The Republican finding underscores the 
independence heightened by the power of a secret ballot.2   
Various interest groups tried to influence the caucuses.  Most prominent among 
them was the Utah Education Association.  With significant effort placed on organizing 
for the neighborhood gatherings, nine percent of delegate positions went to those 
affiliating with the group, most of them in the Democratic Party.  Other groups attempted 
to influence the delegate selections with little success.  The analysis of Scruggs and 
Magleby indicated a process highly resistant to organization by campaigns or special 
interest groups.  They wrote:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Scruggs and Magleby, “Delegates as Trustees,” 21. 




In researching this paper, we were informed by countless anecdotes of caucus attenders 
who voted for a would-be delegate, not because of the delegate's candidate preferences, 
but because he or she was a well known neighbor who was likely to be a lay 
ecclesiastical leader (Mormons have no local paid clergy) or their child's Sunday 
School teacher, Little League coach or classroom parent.3 
 
Despite the considerable efforts of candidates and interest groups to influence caucus 
outcomes, neighborly ties trumped political organization.4   
Polls indicated that delegates were more wealthy, educated, partisan (especially 
Republicans), Mormon, and male than voters.  While 29 percent of registered GOP voters 
made less than $25,000 a year, this income group comprised only 13 percent of 
Republican delegates.  Democratic delegates reported similar findings with 40 percent of 
voters earning less than $25,000 while only 30 percent of delegates made a similar 
amount. Wealthy voters attended caucus meetings in considerably higher numbers and 
were consequently elected to more delegate positions.  Because of the delegates’ 
significant political influence, the absence of lower-income delegates hampered their 
clout.5 
Educational attainment also separated those elected to delegate positions from the 
general public.  Forty-two percent of GOP voters graduated from college, but 65 percent 
of delegates earned degrees.  Similarly, 37 percent of Democrats had earned college 
diplomas, but 59 percent of Democratic delegates shared this educational status.  The 
same poll showed that those attending caucuses were more likely to be educated than 
registered voters but still less than delegates.  The 1992 caucus-convention process  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Ibid., 23. 
4 Ibid., 15. 




disproportionately favored those with higher educational achievement.6 
Degrees of political ideology also were evident within the caucus system.  GOP 
delegates were much more likely to self-identify as “very conservative” (44 percent) as 
compared to Republican primary voters (23 percent).  In contrast, only 13 percent of 
Democratic delegates identified themselves as “very liberal” with nine percent of 
Democratic voters adopting a similar label.  Interestingly, Democratic delegates were 
more likely to call themselves “moderate” than a typical Democratic voter (36 to 26 
percent).  The campaign teams were aware of these ideological differences.  In explaining 
its campaign strategy to attract GOP voters, a Bennett campaign consultant said, “A total 
of 59 percent are delegates for serious, philosophical/ issue-type reasons.  This is very 
different than a primary, much less a general election, and these voters must be treated 
very differently.”7  Dave Jones, campaign manager for Owens, explained his similar 
approach.  “Strategy-wise, you run to the left in a convention and run to the right in the 
general.”8  A campaign consultant encouraged Bennett to follow this course in mirror 
image.  “My advice to you is to protect yourself on the Right.”9  A more ideologically 
driven pool of delegate voters required candidates to appeal in more partisan ways than 
typically employed in a general or even primary election.10   
With religion a key factor in local politics—67 percent of Utahns belonged to the 
Mormon Church at the time—Scruggs and Magleby asked caucus participants to identify 
both their faith and degree of commitment.  The poll revealed that Republican delegates 
self-identified as “very active” LDS 83 percent of the time, far outpacing the GOP (68 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Ibid., 30-31. 
7 Memorandum from Donald Devine. “Final Convention Plan—Following May Poll,” Bennett collection. 
8 Dave Jones, interview by author, 20 April 2011, Salt Lake City. 
9 Memorandum from Gordon Jones, 30 October 1991, Bennett collection. 




percent) and state (46 percent) averages.  Utah historian Thomas Alexander pointed out 
the strong correlation between the Mormon Church and the Republican Party.  He wrote:  
A recent tendency for Mormons to join the Republican Party en masse has raised the 
distinct possibility of a return to the religiously divided politics of the nineteenth 
century when nearly all of the Mormons were members of the People’s Party and 
virtually all non-Mormons joined the Liberal Party.11   
 
Religion played a key role in the political affiliation of both Mormons and non-Mormons 
in the state.  On the Republican side, the caucuses proved Alexander’s argument in even 
greater numbers than general voting trends indicated.   
The Democratic caucuses provided a more complicated narrative that displayed 
somewhat contradictory evidence to Alexander’s conclusion.  Most Democratic voters 
did not affiliate with the LDS Church.  Voters selected “no preference” more often than 
“very active LDS,” with Catholics, “somewhat active LDS,” and Protestants trailing close 
behind.  Yet the 1992 caucuses revealed a strong religious divide among Democratic 
Party delegates.  Thirty-nine percent of the delegates reported a high level of commitment 
to the Mormon Church, more than double the average for Democratic voters (18 percent).  
Mormon leaders encourage members to participate actively in civic functions, perhaps a 
key factor in the overrepresentation of its member in both parties.  With significant 
numbers of highly motivated Mormons wielding important power within the Democratic 
Party caucuses, Alexander’s argument needs to be more nuanced.  The 1992 Republican 
caucuses were overwhelming Mormon, but Democratic caucuses showed much religious 
diversity, including a significant number of practicing Mormons.12   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Thomas G. Alexander, Utah, The Right Place: The Official Centennial History (Salt Lake City, UT: 
Gibbs Smith, 2003), 420. 




The gender gap is evident in both parties, but especially telling in the selection of 
Republican delegates.  Women outnumber men among GOP registered voters, but men 
won 63 percent of delegate positions.  The margin was much smaller in the Democratic 
Party with women making up 52 percent of voters and 47 percent of delegates.  With men 
controlling the bulk of delegate positions, women’s issues were often ignored, especially 
in the Republican convention. 
Once the delegates were chosen, yet before the convention, candidates for office 
moved to court supporters.  Scruggs and Magleby note: 
It is difficult to overstate for those unacquainted with the Utah system, how heavily the 
delegates are lobbied during the seven to eight weeks separating the caucuses from the 
conventions….That there was ample opportunity for the delegates to meet personally 
with the various candidates is evidenced by the 91% of the Republican delegates who 
reported they had met with all or most of the candidates for governor and senator.13  
 
Utah’s caucus-convention process provided an environment of retail politics where 
delegates expected individual attention from the various candidates.  Extensive polling 
took place during the brief eight-week window with 84 percent of GOP delegates 
reporting that they had been polled five or more times leading up to the convention.  
Approximately 55 percent were polled more than 10 times. Candidates recognize that 
delegates wield a tremendous amount of power in the state, particularly in the Republican 
Party where the GOP nomination almost always translates to victory in the general 
election.14 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Ibid., 26. 







THE PUSH TO SEVENTY PERCENT 
 
In June, Republican and Democratic delegates gathered at state nominating 
conventions to select their party’s candidates for federal and state office.  Campaigns had 
scrambled to court newly elected delegates who would control their political fate.  A 
competitive slate of races—open U.S. Senate, gubernatorial, and congressional seats—
gave the 1992 conventions added importance.  If a candidate could win 70 percent of the 
delegate vote, he or she would win the nomination outright.  If no one reached this 
number, the state would hold a primary election between the top two campaigns.   
On the Republican side, the Joe Cannon and Bob Bennett strategies differed 
mostly due to where each candidate began the contest.  “Cannon was the frontrunner 
from the beginning,” Bennett’s assistant campaign manager said.  “Cannon was the 
establishment guy.  He was in the race really early.  And their strategy was to build a case 
of inevitability.”1  Cannon’s early campaign advertising emphasized his strong lead and, 
despite a heavy registered Republican advantage, the political strength of the presumptive 
Democratic nominee, Wayne Owens.  In one of his first campaign mailers, Cannon 
stated: “We are going to beat Wayne Owens.  But we will need to do it together.  Wayne 
is well recognized as one of the best fundraisers and campaigners in the entire U.S. 
Congress….A party divided will lose the Senate seat to Wayne Owens.”2  While warning 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Hopkins interview.   
2 “Joe Cannon for Senate,” Campaign Advertisement Letter, 4 December 1991, Utah State Republican 




of Owens worked to Cannon’s advantage, his assessment of the Democrat was not 
exaggerated.  Owens began the race with higher name identification than any of his 
challengers for the Senate seat.  If they avoided a contentious and expensive primary 
fight, Republicans could focus on bringing down the sitting congressman.  Cannon staked 
out a position as the early Republican frontrunner in hopes of uniting the party behind 
him for the difficult general election ahead.  
 While the Cannon strategy made political sense, potential Republican candidates 
had no desire to clear the way for an easy Cannon nomination.  The 1992 election was 
only the second time in Utah history that an open U.S. Senate seat existed.  Candidates 
waited years for this kind of opportunity and had no intention of retreating.  Bennett 
entered the race hoping to claim the seat once held by his father.  Other well-connected 
Republicans challenged Cannon, but each, including Bennett, clearly came into the race 
as underdogs.  Brent Ward, a former U.S. attorney for Utah, touted his experience 
aggressively prosecuting pornography in the state, including the removal of Salt Lake 
City’s only X-rated movie theater.  Ted Stewart entered the race well connected to the 
Utah political establishment thanks to his time as a staffer for U.S. Representative Jim 
Hansen.  He later served on the Utah Public Service Commission, a post that allowed him 
to burnish his free-market credentials, albeit in relative anonymity. Stewart presented a 
palatable choice to delegates.  “Someone must be willing to stand up and tell the people 
of this country the truth,” his campaign brochures announced.  “A contest between Ted 




Republican and an eastern-style liberal Democrat.”3  While the message was right, 
Stewart lacked the funding to spread it adequately.4 
Bennett focused on Cannon as the frontrunner, but also on challengers who could 
deny him a place on the primary ballot.  Bennett’s staff regarded Ward as a significant 
challenger who could close the gap on Cannon.  One campaign consultant pointed out, 
“The strongest candidate is Ward.  He looks and talks like the two most successful state 
politicians (Garn and Hatch).”5  His only problem: “He does not have money.”6  Sensing 
an angry electorate, Ward delivered a message of dramatic change.  “It’s time for a 
rebellion,” his campaign brochure proclaimed.  “Today we are spending $1.78 for every 
$1.00 of tax revenue.  This is because of gutless wonders in Congress who can’t say 
‘no.’”7  While the message resonated with some voters, the anger pushed others away.  
“Ward and Stewart give them solutions but Ward comes on too strong and Stewart cannot 
get the resources to be competitive,” a Bennett consultant reported.8  Heading into the 
convention, Cannon remained the frontrunner with Bennett holding on to second place.    
Republican leaders in the Utah State Legislature proposed a bill making a key rule 
change that altered each campaign’s convention strategy.  Various party elites wanted a 
multiple-round balloting system to eliminate confrontational primary challenges.  The 
past format consisted of a single ballot that included all Republican candidates.  As more 
candidates filed for a particular office it was difficult for a frontrunner to win 70 percent 
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of the total convention vote and avoid a primary runoff in September.  Multiple-round 
balloting would eliminate candidates after each round until only two were left.  If on this 
last ballot the winner did not cross the delegate vote threshold, a primary election would 
be held between the top two finishers.  Just a few months before both party conventions, 
the Utah State Legislature passed the bill but with a delayed implementation that 
mandated this form of balloting at state conventions beginning in 1993.  Republicans 
expected the changes to be approved immediately, going so far as to send instructions on 
how they should implement the process in the 1992 convention.  The amendment meant 
the U.S. Senate race would maintain the single ballot.  This significantly changed the 
campaign strategy of the various candidates.  Under multiple ballot rules, Cannon 
realistically could win 70 percent of the delegate vote.  With the return to a single vote, 
he faced a likely primary challenge.  Just days before the convention, Cannon told the 
Deseret News, “There's a mathematical possibility I could get 70 percent, but really only 
a mathematical chance. It looks like a primary, and that's fine.”9  The convention would 
demonstrate his political strength before the critical primary and general elections.  For 
the remaining Republican candidates, the goal was simpler.  “I only had to come in 
second,” Bennett recalled.10   Most expected him to emerge from the convention, but to 
make it to the primary, he could not lose ground to the other candidates while chipping 
away at Cannon’s lead.11 
On the day of the convention, Cannon delivered a surprise with the unannounced 
appearance of country music legend Lee Greenwood singing his popular song, “God !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Bless the U.S.A.”  Many in the crowd responded enthusiastically, singing along with the 
star.  Stewart’s campaign manager said, “It was pretty impressive to be in that arena and 
have a surprise of Lee Greenwood walk on stage who was a superstar at the time.”12  A 
1992 Republican delegate remembered the experience differently.  “Suddenly you had 
this huge American flag drop.  It had a certain effect, breathtaking would be the word,” 
he said.  “But I thought it was completely over the top.”13  While the Greenwood 
appearance undoubtedly created a significant buzz at the convention, it is unclear whether 
or not the performance drove many voters in any particular direction. 
Bennett’s plan to secure the runner-up position was nearly thwarted. While 
underfinanced and modestly represented at the convention, Stewart delivered an 
impressive convention speech that moved enough delegates to make the race competitive.  
“He knocked it out of the park,” his campaign manager recalled.  “Honestly going in, I 
didn’t think we’d get that close.”14  Others similarly remembered Stewart’s convention 
performance.  “[He] gave the speech of his life, and my speech was badly botched,” 
Bennett said.15   
Ultimately, Cannon easily outpaced both challengers with nearly double their 
votes at 1,112, or 46 percent.  Bennett came in second with 580 votes, or 24 percent, just 
nosing out Stewart by 1.5 percent.  Ward, meanwhile, faded from contention and finished 
a distant fourth in the balloting.  Some political insiders considered Cannon’s 
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performance a failure, yet given Stewart’s surprising surge and the consequent scare to 
Bennett, neither primary challenger lost much momentum from the convention results.16  
Even with a convincing victory, the correlation between convention success and 
primary momentum is tenuous.  “Nobody else is paying any attention,” Bennett said of 
the process.  “None of the voters have any idea what’s going on.  But within the party, 
within the convention, everybody is intense.  And when it’s over, the general public says, 
‘Is there a primary coming up?  What is this?’”17  Cannon remained the favorite heading 
into the primary with Bennett hoping to stage an upset.  
Utah’s caucus-convention system created campaign considerations unique to the 
state.  An underfunded candidate can often be competitive in a race due to the smaller 
delegate pool, as Stewart evidenced with a surprisingly strong performance.  A primary 
election is different as a much larger number of voters enter the conversation.  Unable to 
raise significant funds from sources outside of friends and family, most candidates relied 
upon their own resources.  With Cannon spending millions on the race, the only 
challenger able to keep pace was the millionaire Bennett.  Trying to win over the 2,500 
state delegates proved expensive for the Republican candidates.  Cannon spent $3.6 
million prior to the convention with Bennett following suit at just over $1 million.  Brent 
Ward spent $121,000 with Stewart trailing behind at $71,000.  The small number of 
delegates allowed underfunded candidates to compete in the convention as Stewart 
demonstrated.  Yet in the 1992 Senate race, the biggest spenders moved on to the 
primary.  The ousted Stewart said, “The cold, hard fact remains that it was still the guys 
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with all the money that came out of convention.  And even if the poor guy came out he 
would have probably gotten stomped in the primary.”18  The disparity between the 
candidates’ finances was especially revealing with Cannon spending 50 times more than 
Stewart before the convention.19 
On the Democratic side, Owens adopted the Cannon strategy, maintaining that the 
party should unite behind its leading candidate.  Anderson fought back vigorously.  The 
millionaire’s willingness to spend money on the race complicated Owens’ path to the 
nomination.  Preconvention financial reports showed Anderson spending $727,063 
compared to Owens’ $646,698.  Candidates who challenge incumbents often struggle to 
fundraise, but Anderson’s personal wealth solved this problem.  His willingness to spend 
his own personal fortune guaranteed Owens a difficult race. 
Some party leaders believed that Owens could reach the 70 percent threshold and 
avoid a primary runoff.  Many discouraged Anderson from mounting serious opposition, 
but the millionaire refused to surrender.  He entered the race nearly a year before Owens 
when most expected Garn to run for reelection.  Having spent a significant amount of 
time and money well before Owens’ decision to run, Anderson was in it to the end.  He 
felt Owens’ position as an insider tainted him in the eyes of many voters.  Despite the 
daunting prospects of defeating a sitting congressman, Anderson geared up for a tough 
fight.20   
Anderson was not alone in his views of Owens.  His candidacy revealed deep 
fissures within a declining Utah Democratic Party.  While Owens received important !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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union support from the Utah Education Association and AFL-CIO, former political 
leaders such as Governor Cal Rampton and Senator Frank Moss lined up behind 
Anderson. The Sierra Club supported the Owens campaign while Anderson lobbied rural 
Democrats who often opposed the large-scale wilderness designations that Owens 
favored.  Rampton believed Anderson had a better chance to win the general election.  
“[Owens is] not a favorite to win in any case,” he said.  “It’s not impossible.  But given 
the political makeup of this state, he’ll have a difficult time.”21  A fractured Democratic 
Party hurt an already struggling Owens campaign.22   
The location of the state convention played an important role in the Anderson 
strategy.  While 2,500 state delegates are selected from across the state, a significant 
number do not attend the convention.  The highly competitive races attracted 2,245 
delegates, a number the Deseret News called “one of the largest turnouts of Democrats in 
recent history.”23  Still, this figure indicated that 255 delegates—10 percent—did not 
show up to the convention.  Anderson believed much of his support came from rural 
Democrats who opposed Owens’ support of wilderness legislation.  "If we can get our 
delegates to the convention, OK,” Anderson said.  “But you know it's a long way from 
Kanab,” a town in distant southern Utah.  Mobilizing voters in rural Utah understandably 
concerned the Anderson campaign.   
 In the final vote tally, Owens won 1,564 votes, or 69.7 percent, to Anderson’s 
645.  A third candidate, Kyle Kopitke, won a meager 36 votes or less than two percent of 
the total vote.  If state leaders had instituted multiple-round balloting in 1992, Owens !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Dawn House, “Owens Responds to Attacks by Getting Back to Issues,” Salt Lake Tribune, 29 March 
1992. 
22 Paul Rolly, “On the Stump: Utah’s Campaign ’92 With Paul Rolly,” Salt Lake Tribune, 30 April 1992; 
Paul Rolly, “On the Stump: Utah’s Campaign ’92 With Paul Rolly,” Salt Lake Tribune, 23 April 1992. 




would have needed only eight votes from the Kopitke total to cross the 70 percent 
threshold.  Ironically, it was Owens’ campaign manager Dave Jones (also a state 
representative) who pushed the amendment in the state legislature to delay the 
implementation of multiple-round balloting. Jones’ argument was that the campaign had 
already begun, and that the state should not change the rules mid-race.  More importantly, 
the Owens campaign feared that Cannon would reach the 70 percent mark under 
multiple-ballot rules and thereby avoid an expensive Republican primary. The tactic 
forced Cannon into a primary challenge but came back to hurt the Owens candidacy as 
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PRIMARY: BATTLEGROUND OF CONSERVATISM 
 
 
Almost every poll heading into the Republican primary indicated Bob Bennett 
trailed significantly.  “Throughout the state there was an assumption that Joe Cannon was 
going to be the nominee,” one Bennett staff member recalled.1  Especially telling is how 
the most competitive part of the electoral process occurred not in the general election, but 
in the Republican primary.  This important trend underscored the accelerated shift to the 
political right in Utah.   
Few issues separated Cannon and Bennett.  As the underdog, Bennett ran an 
aggressive campaign with Cannon clearly ahead in the race. “The leading issue for 
Republican primary voters is the economy (27%) followed by the budget (24%) and 
unemployment (8%), accounting for 60% of the electorate,” a Bennett campaign 
consultant reported.2  On each issue, the candidates largely agreed.  Economic issues 
trumped all others across the country and in the minds of Utah voters, but the similar 
views of Cannon and Bennett in regard to reducing government spending and cutting 
taxes prevented them from shaping the election.   
Issues that separated the pair were minor points and included the line-item veto, 
term limits, and political action committee donations.  Term limits provided Bennett a 
chance to separate himself from Cannon.  He was not alone as a term-limit fever swept 
the nation.  In the 1992 election, 14 states passed laws that limited the number of years a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Larry Shepherd, interview by author, 4 April 2011, Salt Lake City. 




member of Congress could serve, bills that the Supreme Court later ruled 
unconstitutional.  The Utah Republican Party adopted language into its official 1992 
platform that said, “We believe in the concept of term limitation.  We recognize and 
support term limitation as framed in the U.S. Constitution.”3  The absence of term 
limitation language in the U.S. Constitution complicated this stance, but poll numbers 
indicated that Utahns favored congressional term limits by a 36 percent margin.4 
Bennett cast the issue of the line-item veto as a way to enforce fiscal discipline in 
the federal budgetary process.  The president could veto any project passed in the annual 
congressional appropriations bills without vetoing the entire bill.  Cannon disagreed, 
calling the policy position a “glib, political solution.”5  Internal polling indicated that 
most voters sided with Bennett on the issue, opposing the position of Cannon and sitting 
U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch.  A campaign memo explained:  
The question of Hatch/Cannon vs Bennett on line item veto separates in our favor 
better than any other in the poll—61.7 percent to 14.0 percent (and many of the 
opposed are less knowledgeable).  This is not an issue that voters think of themselves, 
however, so it would have to be sold, strongly.6  
 
Voters needed to be prompted on the issue before volunteering it.  “We suspect that many 
people do not understand what the line item veto really means,” a Bennett consultant 
suggested.7  While not the ideal issue, Bennett sensed an opening and pursued it.    
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Bennett prepared to run commercials criticizing Cannon for his position on the 
issue.  Recognizing his vulnerability, Cannon abandoned his stance and supported the 
line-item veto with Bennett, President George Bush, and a host of other Republicans.  
The move infuriated insiders in the Bennett camp.  “That information in [his] hands cost 
us the opportunity to hammer Cannon with the one basic philosophical difference 
between he and Bennett.”8  Bennett jumped on the change in position, although the issue 
was unimportant for many voters, limiting damage to Cannon.   
Interestingly, Bennett would later renege on both of the campaign policies that 
differentiated him from Cannon.  He served three terms in the Senate and lost seeking a 
fourth, clear violations of his support for term limits and promise to serve only two terms.  
While initially supporting efforts to establish a line-item veto, he recanted that position as 
well.  Six years after the 1992 race, he specifically mentioned this issue in a speech on 
the Senate floor:  
I apologize albeit much too late, to my primary opponent who stood in opposition to 
the line-item veto.  And this was a matter of difference between the two of us in the 
primary….I, as one senator at least on the other side of the issue, throw in the towel, 
eat a little crow and declare my willingness to escape from a previous position.9   
 
Cannon chose not to accept donations from political action committees in the 
campaign, something Bennett refused to do.  "I figure that's about $500,000 I won't be 
getting from PACs," Cannon said.  "I've been in Washington. I know how it works. They 
[PAC special interests] expect something for that money. I'll listen to anyone. But I don't 
want to have to listen because of [a PAC contribution]."10  Bennett argued that Cannon’s 
disdain for such contributions was hypocritical.  Specifically, he criticized Cannon’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 John Harmer to Donald Devine, 25 August 1992, Bennett collection.   
9 105 Cong. Rec. S698 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bennett). 




campaign donations to other candidates while employed at Geneva Steel. Similar to the 
line-item veto, the issue moved few GOP voters and ultimately had minor impact on the 
race. 
Except for these policy disagreements, the two candidates offered little to 
differentiate themselves.  As Bennett told one newspaper reporter:  
Joe and I don't have great ideological differences. We're both white, middle-class, 
middle-age male Mormons. We're both chief executive officers. In fact, this is 
probably the only race in the nation between the former CEOs of companies listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange.11  
 
The claim of “middle class” was clearly an exaggeration for two multimillionaires, but 
Bennett had a point.  Not much separated the candidates either politically or 
temperamentally. 
With no ideological difference between the candidates, the campaign largely 
revolved around personality.  Bennett attempted to center his campaign on a theme of 
change with he the most likely to effect it.  Cannon arguably did the same but with a 
softer edge.  The Bennett message eventually resonated with voters across the ideological 
spectrum who wanted to shake up the Washington establishment.  Critical to shaping 
Bennett’s image was a successful ad campaign that sharpened the differences in 
personality and style between the candidates.  Television and radio would create a 
candidate, conservative in policy, determined to confront Washington insiders, and who 
spoke with authority.  Ads would give him the advantage he lacked from elected 
experience and high-profile success.   
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Both Bennett and Cannon came across as strong, mainstream conservatives, but 
as one campaign staffer said, “[The race] was more about style than it was substance.”12  
This style was best displayed through the campaign advertising of each candidate. A 
political mentor wrote Bennett, “Your discovery of that talented ad agency was a ‘ten-
strike’—they were truly creative and ‘took the town by storm.’” 13  Another analyst 
wrote, “Not that ad spots should be the ultimate measure of a man’s character, but they 
may very well have been the deciding factor here because many Republicans perceived 
little philosophical separation between the two men.”14  The ads, while not exposing any 
significant ideological disparity between the candidates, displayed an important stylistic 
difference.   
The Bennett ads took a sharp, contrasting approach.  While he spoke throughout 
the spot, the camera angle and background abruptly shifted.  Bennett recalled:  
All of the sudden it’s just my lips.  And then it’s just my eyes.  And then I’m in profile 
not looking at you, looking off to the side.  And then I’m in black and white.  And then 
I’ve got a suit and tie on and the background has changed from black to white and so 
on.  And under it is this driving music.15  
 
The innovative Bennett ads proved effective.  “We called it the MTV approach at the 
time because of the very quick cuts and very close-up and back away and with Bennett 
giving a really strong, dynamic message,” one campaign staffer recalled.16  “You’ve got 
to break through the clutter with an ad that everybody will remember,” Bennett said.  
“The campaign does not take place in a vacuum.”  He continued: 
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In the primary, you are competing with Budweiser ads, baseball, Breck Shampoo.  
You’re not just competing Bennett versus Cannon.  It’s not a matter of here’s so many 
Bennett ads and here’s so many Cannon ads....There are so many ads, how do you 
break through the clutter?17  
  
The message was simple: change.  Somebody needed to stand up to Washington, and the 
cutting ads reinforced an image of a politician willing to go back to Congress and do just 
that.  
Other campaign pundits seem less impressed.  “I don’t often see my wife’s face 
that close up, and she’s much prettier than Bob,” one said.18  Bennett recalled anecdotal 
evidence from voters.  “That ad started to run, and I had women come up to me in the 
grocery store and complain bitterly, ‘I hate your ads, they jump around too much.  I can’t 
follow them.’ And I’m thinking, ‘But you’re watching them.’”19  The Bennett ads 
effectively combined a modern, visually provocative approach with a conservative tone 
and message.   
Cannon pursued a much more traditional method to his television advertising.  
What the commercials lacked in novelty they made up for in quantity.  Cannon spent 
more than $3 million on radio and television advertising, significantly outspending 
Bennett and any other candidate in Utah political history.  Before the election, television 
advertisers reported that one in every eight commercials on the three network stations 
was a political commercial, nearly half coming from the expensive Republican Senate 
primary.  Cannon and Bennett spent so much that television stations refused airtime to 
candidates for lesser statewide offices.  One of Bennett’s press aides at the time recalled, 
“We were still in an age back then when you could buy enough TV time to saturate the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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market,” he said.  “Now there are too many choices.”20  Saturating the market came with 
risks.  Bennett later explained:  
The whole question is stickiness.  Do you remember the ad?  Does it stick?  The 
Cannon ads were all very traditional, off the shelf, standard political ads.  And 
therefore people would forget them.  And then when he ran as many as he did, people 
were sick of them….There is such a thing as being overexposed.21   
 
Even Cannon supporters credited the Bennett ads for their candidate’s defeat.  A Cannon 
voter complained in a letter to the editor, “In my opinion, the best man didn’t win.  The 
best ad agency did.”22  Looking back at the race, a prominent Bennett staffer recalled, 
“We would not have won the primary without [the] advertising.”23  The chief of staff for 
Wayne Owens echoed this.  “We did focus groups and everyone liked the Bennett ads a 
lot.  They really stood out in a sea of ads.”24  Cannon outspent Bennett in advertising, but 
the innovative Bennett ads held the attention of voters, particularly those disenchanted 
with the current political environment.  With virtually no substantive issues separating the 
two candidates, the race came down to style with many undecided voters siding with the 
aggressor Bennett.25    
Cannon’s campaign strategy focused on entering the race with a big splash, 
spending millions of dollars in the early stages of the race.  Initially the strategy worked 
as Cannon developed a seemingly insurmountable lead.  Bennett tried to counter with his 
own spending.  In a campaign memo, consultants outlined how he could effectively do 
this:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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We need to be able to do something that will accomplish two objectives: First: Make 
Cannon’s greatest asset become his biggest liability.  Every time someon [sic] sees a 
Joe Cannon ad they have to immediately react by saying – “…there he goes again, 
wasting money.”  Second: Bennett has to be able to avoid the ‘big spender’ label.  This 
can only be done by some comparison with the amount that Cannon is spending.26   
 
Despite the $2.1 million that Bennett spent from his fortune on the GOP primary, it was 
Cannon who appeared the spendthrift, almost tripling Bennett’s expenditures.  In 
contrast, Bennett largely escaped criticism for his significant spending.   
Another Bennett campaign tactic portrayed Cannon as trying to buy votes.  
“There are two ways to get the Republican nomination for Senate,” a consultant advised 
Bennett before a debate performance.  “One way is to work your way up through the 
party, like Jake Garn did.  The other is to just buy it outright.  Joe Cannon is doing the 
latter.  That point needs to be brought out.”27  Bennett made this argument, but it took 
time for voters to respond.  As one political science professor told a Salt Lake Tribune 
reporter, “Even though people will complain, there’s something flattering about 
millionaires spending this kind of money to get my vote.”28  The 1992 election proved 
this conventional wisdom wrong with voters questioning Cannon’s fiscal discipline. 
In a draft campaign spot, Bennett compared Cannon’s campaign spending to 
congressional spending, a major concern among Utah voters.  “There is a difference 
between Bob Bennett and Joe Cannon.  A big one.  Debt.  My campaign is solvent.  Joe’s 
campaign is over five million dollars in debt.”29  Bennett cast himself as the candidate 
fighting big spending, utilizing Cannon’s expenditures to make a comparison between the 
two.  In response to an open-ended poll question about why voters selected a particular !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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candidate, one respondent said, “I think [Cannon] is spending too much money.  He is 
trying to buy the election.  I’m turned off by the money he has spent.  I think it would be 
cheaper for him to just buy the radio stations.”30  While his personal fortune allowed 
Cannon repeated access to voters, it also provided a wedge issue that Bennett effectively 
exploited, ironically by spending a significant amount of money to explain the issue to 
voters.   
Cannon’s reputation as the man who saved Geneva Steel with its more than a 
thousand jobs aided him greatly in the race.  Bennett also claimed a strong business 
resumé having earned millions as the CEO of a day-planner company.  But as a Bennett 
campaign employee pointed out, not all business leaders are viewed the same by the 
voting public.  “A businessman against the savior of Geneva Steel and its blue-collar jobs 
(a planner just does not have the romance of a steel factory).”31  Relatively few people 
knew about Bennett’s work while nearly everyone in the state had heard about Cannon’s 
resurrection of the failing steel mill.   
While his ownership of Geneva Steel brought Cannon great wealth and public 
visibility, it also brought a degree of political vulnerability.  Bennett believed the issue 
would hurt Cannon throughout the campaign.  “You may well be right that the 
environmentalists…will dog his footsteps, but that won’t happen until the primary at the 
earliest,” a consultant told Bennett.32  Those attacks never materialized.  The Bennett 
campaign decided to prod the issue, drafting ads with pictures of Geneva Steel smoke 
stacks shown while the narrator talks about the need for “clean, businesses of the 
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Information Age.”33  In a campaign flyer, Bennett warned, “Owens has made it clear he’s 
going to attack Joe for Geneva’s pollution problems and keep him on the defensive.”34  
These attacks, however, failed to stick with voters.  A Bennett campaign memo said: 
“‘Businessman’ is a tough ad and only should be run if the race will be lost anyway and, 
maybe, not even then.  This ad does hit Cannon at his Geneva strength but it is a very 
hard thing to change this perception so late.”35  
To protect himself from this criticism, Cannon explained the many pollution-
control efforts that Geneva Steel had implemented.  The measures came at a significant 
cost, more than double the amount Cannon and other investors initially paid to purchase 
the abandoned mill.  “Short of shutting Geneva down, no one could have done more 
faster than we did at Geneva to improve the environment,” Cannon told a reporter.36  
Geneva Steel aired commercials that discussed the reduction in pollution since Cannon’s 
ownership.  Cannon prepared for a serious challenge to his environmental record, but the 
Republican primary electorate proved more willing to accept reduced levels of pollution 
in exchange for economic development.37 
Bennett’s polling confirmed that most Utahns wanted pollution reduced but not at 
the expense of jobs:   
Geneva certainly does not hold the power it did among convention delegates.  Few will 
automatically vote for Cannon on the issue and 60 percent would like its pollution 
reduced.  Given the general disposition to favor jobs over pollution control, however, it 
would be dangerous to push the matter as a general proposition.38   
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The Bennett campaign followed this advice, largely ignoring Cannon’s success at the 
steel giant.  Had Cannon won the primary and faced off against the pro-environment 
Owens in the general election, undoubtedly this issue would have played a central role in 
the campaign.   
While sharing a conservative philosophy, a picture of a less ideologically driven 
Bennett emerged in private correspondence.  One campaign consultant wrote Bennett in 
follow up to a previous conversation.  “You have resentments left over among the true 
believers from your father’s campaigns.”39  Bennett later recounted an interview with a 
Republican presidential hiring committee in 1976 when he informed the interviewer, 
“I’m not a true believer,” regarding conservative orthodoxy.40  Such indications of 
ideological tempering left his campaign rhetoric emotionally flat and seemingly lacking 
in passion.  This political reticence deprived Bennett the fiery rhetoric that conservatives 
expected.  “Your reluctance to develop a shorthand for communicating passion on hot-
button issues left delegates with a feeling that you are interested in issues, but that you 
don’t care about them deeply,” a consultant said.41  He postulated that the issue might be 
a matter of class for Bennett.  He said:  
It may be that you are too insulated from the middle.  You do not feel their rage as I 
do.  They are frustrated, helpless, rebellious, and ripe for ideological plucking.  If you 
do not understand their passion, channel it constructively, explain it and justify it (to 
themselves and to the ruling class), then someone else will.  You have not yet felt this 
passion because for the most part, you have been dealing so far with that ruling class 
itself.42   
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While passion did not come easily to Bennett, his ads constructed a personal intensity 
that caught voters’ attention and convinced them he was their advocate.  
Along with the ad campaign, Bennett credited a last-minute surge in rural 
counties for his victory.  His contention that rural Utah would play a key role was based 
on the fact that while these areas comprised just 13 percent of the population in 1990, 
they held 27 percent of GOP voters.  Weeks before the election, according to a Bennett 
consultant: “Cannon dominates Bennett in the rural areas on every important matter in 
the poll.  Overall, Cannon wins 60 to 26 percent in the rural counties, a 34 point 
advantage there.”  Cannon did win the rural vote, but only by an eight percent margin of 
victory.  He had to do better to overcome Bennett’s edge in his native Salt Lake County, 
Utah’s most populated region.43   
 Cannon’s significant lead in rural Utah was attributable to the success of Geneva 
Steel.  Not only did the plant employ thousands in urban Utah County, but it purchased 
mineral resources from numerous rural Utah suppliers.  These investments expanded the 
footprint of the company throughout the state.  "No candidate has done more than I have 
for the economic development of rural Utah," Cannon said.44  The Bennett campaign 
confirmed Cannon’s strength in rural Utah without the pollution liabilities he encountered 
in urban Utah.  “Rural voters also like Geneva more, and are much more willing to accept 
pollution for jobs,” a consultant wrote in response to a campaign poll.45 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Memorandum from Donald Devine, “Analysis of August 19 Utah Primary Poll.” 
44 Sheila R. McCann, “GOP Candidates Draw Battle Lines in U.S. Senate Race,” Salt Lake Tribune, 2 
September 1992. 




Bennett memos showed that the campaign was attuned to this finding.  “Rural 
areas are still the Cannon difference,” one consultant warned.46  Bennett’s initial rural 
campaign strategy focused on enlisting the help of local elected officials who would take 
the Bennett cause to area voters.  Polling revealed the ineffectiveness of this strategy.  
“The clear message in the polls is that we need work in the rural areas.  Talking about 
getting commissioners is fine but we need direct voter contact,” a consultant wrote.47  
Campaign staffers believed that television advertising would take care of this direct voter 
contact, but little movement occurred in the polls. 48 
Something had to change for Bennett to cut into Cannon’s lead.  The campaign 
attempted a different media approach.  One campaign staffer recalled this important shift 
in rural strategy.  “The Bennett camp took out ads in rural newspapers comparing Joe 
Cannon’s spending on the Senate race to the annual budget for the particular county that 
paper appeared in,” he said.49  These examples proved to be especially compelling in 
many of the counties where Cannon’s spending exceeded the county budget.  The ads 
stated that, “Cannon campaign expenditures exceed the operating budgets of more than 
half of Utah’s counties.”50  Rural voters responded positively to the attack.  “When that 
hit, Joe’s people went absolutely ballistic,” Bennett said.51  The Cannon camp accused 
Bennett of going negative, but their argument only helped reinforce the spending issue.   
In addition to newspaper and television advertising, Bennett explored other 
options.  “I went into the radio studio and I recorded a 60-second radio spot just !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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hammering on Wayne Owens.”52  When Owens confronted Bennett about the spot, he 
replied, “I have to win a primary. You are the most hated man in rural Utah. If I’m going 
to win the primary, I have to prove to them that I hate you more than Joe hates you.”53  
The response was immediate and overwhelming.  “That spot started to run, and our 
phones started to ring off the hook,” Bennett said.  “We spent all this money on television 
and none of these people had heard of me….Radio was the medium to reach rural 
Utah.”54  Because the newspaper and radio ads ran concurrently, it is difficult to gauge 
the effectiveness of each medium.  Regardless, the Bennett campaign’s last-minute work 
in rural Utah proved effective enough to peel off a significant number of voters in the 
waning days before the primary election.   
A Bennett campaign consultant raised an important point regarding the issue of 
different campaign media.  “You can also be more direct in your attacks on Cannon on 
radio than you can on TV,” he said.  “TV is a cool medium, and does not take well to 
harsh conflict.  Radio is a hot medium, and can stand more fighting.”55  While the 
Bennett TV ads were aggressive, they backed away from directly attacking Cannon.  
“The [television] ads…cannot have a sharp edge because the candidate appears in them 
(and we want to protect him from the negatives),” a consultant explained.56  Different 
media produce different results with varying degrees of tolerance for negative attacks.  
The hard-hitting Bennett radio and newspaper ads proved effective in rural Utah, 
significantly closing the gap between the two candidates in the concluding weeks of the 
campaign.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The other significant difference in the returns occurred in Salt Lake and Utah 
Counties.  In regard to Utah’s two largest counties, pollsters expected Bennett to defeat 
Cannon in his native Salt Lake County with Cannon easily winning in Utah County, 
home to Geneva Steel.  Only part of that prediction came true with Bennett outpacing 
Cannon in Salt Lake County, 53,155 to 42,310, an 11 percent margin.  The two played to 
a virtual tie in Utah County with Cannon winning 23,605 to 23,462.  The result came as a 
shock to Cannon who had called the county, “one of the biggest arrows” in his quiver.57 
 Just a few weeks before the election, the Bennett campaign estimated that 
approximately 125,000 people would vote in the Republican primary.  Turnout more than 
doubled that expectation.  A record number of voters participated in the GOP and 
Democratic primaries, 49 percent of registered voters in the state.  “The turnout in this 
primary was very high, approaching levels normally found only in general elections,” a 
Bennett campaign consultant observed.58  The high turnout benefitted the insurgent 
Bennett who claimed a narrow 135,514 to 128,125, or 51 to 49 percent victory.59 
The results came as a surprise to both campaigns.  In an analysis of four different 
polls conducted less than two weeks before the primary election, the Bennett Campaign 
Steering Committee concluded that Cannon had at least a four percent lead over Bennett 
and maybe as large as a seven percent edge.  The campaign consultant predicted, “Unless 
Bennett’s campaign provides a dramatic way for voters to choose Bennett over Cannon 
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the present situation will not change by the election date.”60  Bennett’s last-ditch 
advertising push in rural Utah helped his vote tally, as did the higher turnout, a result of a 
hard fought and contested race.61 
The Cannon campaign suffered from overconfidence.  He did not go on the 
offensive because his polling placed him as the frontrunner.  Leading until the end of the 
race, Cannon ignored Bennett’s vulnerabilities, especially when such attacks might 
produce a backlash among voters.  “It was like playing defense,” a Bennett campaign 
staffer said.62 Asked why he chose not to run attacks ads, Cannon told a newspaper 
reporter, “I had tremendous pressure to run ‘comparison’ ads on Bob….But we resisted.  
It’s not like Bob is without baggage.  But life isn’t worth that….We ran a good race, we 
just came up 5,000 votes short.”63  One political observer at the time suggested that 
Cannon’s decision not to attack Bennett likely cost him the election.  When asked what 
he might have done differently, Cannon responded, “If I had it to do all over again…I 
probably wouldn’t have spent as much money.”64  Upon hearing of Cannon’s defeat, 
Dave Hansen, the executive director of the Utah Republican Party said, “I never thought 
you could spend too much in an election until this year.”65  Other observers arrived at 
similar conclusions.66   
 Controversy with spirited debate marked the primary contest between the two 
Democrats, Wayne Owens and Doug Anderson.  A picture emerges of a bitter campaign 
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between two factions within the declining Democratic Party.  The party’s state chairman 
complained, "We're a small party in Utah - just 20 percent of voters - and we certainly 
can't afford this."67  While Republicans could endure infighting and still win, Democrats 
had to preserve resources and find common ground to achieve victory.   
Anderson based his campaign on a Washington D.C. scandal that appeared to 
implicate Owens in wrongdoing.  In the midst of a deep recession, this issue focused 
voters on congressional privilege and plenty.  “The overarching issue was fiscal 
discipline,” Dave Jones, the Owens campaign manager recalled.68  An investigation 
revealed that the House bank utilized funds from congressmen’s deposits to cover 
overdraft checks issued by other members.  While no taxpayer funds were involved, the 
perception of a perk available only to members of Congress proved disastrous.  “This 
captured the imagination of a lot of people, angered a lot of people that how can they get 
their fiscal house in order if they can’t even balance their own checkbook?” Jones said.  
“Honestly, I think the [general] election was over at that point.  I really do.”69  While not 
willing to admit defeat, Owens echoed the serious nature of the scandal and seemingly 
his involvement: “I am humiliated by it," Owens said at the time. “It is humbling, 
demeaning, and it's misunderstood. I'm a man who treasured my personal reputation for 
integrity and then this happened.”70  Owens did not exaggerate the situation.  “He did a 
good job painting himself as a fiscal conservative,” Jones said.  “But then the check 
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kiting thing came along and that just totally wiped it out.”71  Polls showed a third of his 
support fall away in the month following the announcement of the scandal.  Severely 
crippled, Owens never fully recovered, even after exoneration.72   
Environmental issues also made Owens vulnerable.  As he explained: 
Environmentalism is a very tough issue in this state because those who hate the 
environmentalists will judge you on your environmental record alone, rather than your 
overall record.  I received 10,000 fewer votes in Washington and Iron Counties in 1974 
than I received in 1972—directly traceable to my support of the Zion Wilderness 
proposal.73  
 
Anderson approved of wilderness protection but not as passionately as Owens.  “I support 
the creation of more wilderness,” he said.  “But I’m convinced my opponent’s plan to set 
aside an area that is three times the size of Yellowstone National Park is overkill.”74  
Measured support of wilderness still allowed Anderson to win suburban and urban voters 
who agreed with the policy.  Arguing for moderation won over rural voters who hated the 
Owens plan.  One reporter mused, “[Owens] has been all but hung in effigy in parts of 
rural Utah.”75  Owens’ campaign manager remembered considering rural Utah a lost 
cause.  “Even if you won it, it wasn’t going to change things,” he said, referring to the 
sparse population. “[Our campaign] was almost entirely focused on urban Utah.”76  
 The environmental issue cut both ways for Owens.  “[He] really endeared himself 
to the liberal base of the party with that issue,” Jones said.  Environmental interest groups 
backed Owens with the Sierra Club calling his election its highest priority in the country. 
With air quality concerns plaguing the GOP’s likely candidate, Joe Cannon, Owens felt !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that the issue presented him with the best chance to win in the general election.  Heading 
into the race, polls placed him far ahead of Anderson.  Consequently, Owens positioned 
himself early for the upcoming general election.77 
Anderson expanded his attacks on Owens to include criticisms of fiscal 
improprieties within his congressional office.  He accused the congressman of 
excessively using free mailing privileges at the expense of taxpayers, a practice 
widespread among lawmakers.  He also criticized Owens’ use of taxpayer-funded travel 
expenses and congressional pay raises.  One ad concluded: “If Wayne Owens acts like 
this in the Congress…what’s going to happen if he gets to the Senate?”78  The ad 
campaign infuriated the Owens camp and even some Anderson supporters.  Democrat 
leaders tried to stop Anderson’s attacks but failed.  Former Governor Cal Rampton and 
U.S. Senator Frank Moss, both supporters of Anderson, publicly rebuked him for the ads. 
With Anderson running scathing ads about Owens, the Democratic Congressman 
returned fire.   Owens attempted to paint Anderson as a carpetbagger, highlighting his 
recent move to Utah before running for political office.  Owens eventually called for a 
truce with each candidate removing his attack ads.  Anderson refused.79 
Owens’ name recognition was difficult to overcome, and the heated Anderson ads 
22 percent margin of victory.  Yet this dominant vote tally was pyrrhic for the 
contentious primary significantly wounded the Democratic nominee.  Bennett campaign 
polling confirmed this: “[Owens] does not receive the support of one-third of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Democrats, suggesting that Anderson had an effect in the primary.”80  Owens’ campaign 
manager repeated the sentiment.  “It was pretty tough to bring people back together after 
that.”81  The bitterness of the contest left hurt feelings and a weakened Democratic 
nominee to face Bennett in the general election.   
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A DEMOCRAT’S LAST STAND 
 
 
The mood of American voters in the 1992 election indicated a desire for change, 
resulting in an inordinate number of competitive races for incumbents.  The House of 
Representatives welcomed 110 new members after the 1992 elections, the highest 
turnover of the body in over 40 years.  Most of this turnover resulted from members 
voluntarily retiring rather than face tough competition and possible defeat.  Owens 
specifically cited an unfriendly redistricting process in 1991 as a reason for abandoning 
his House seat and running for the Senate.   
As a four-term member of Congress, Owens was no political novice.  People 
knew Wayne Owens, and in large part, they liked him.  He won consecutive elections in 
his urban Salt Lake County district by increasingly wide double-digit margins.  Even in 
his previous Senate defeat in 1974, he nearly defeated the Republican candidate Jake 
Garn, losing the contest by just six percent.  Several key issues hurt him in the 1992 race, 
including voters’ perception of him as a political insider and the House bank scandal.  
Ultimately these issues and the Democratic Party label dragged him to defeat.  In the 
context of a Utah growing more conservative and attuned to the Republican stance on 
social issues, Owens found little room to maneuver.1  
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The political environment in the 1992 election presented an opportunity for a 
political dark horse to make an impact.  Bob Bennett attempted to fill that role.  Several 
months after declaring his candidacy for Senate, polls gave Bennett a meager three 
percent of popular support.  While unable to capitalize on any significant name 
recognition, Bennett utilized the situation to his advantage.  With many voters feeling 
alienated from the political process, a lack of elected experience became an asset.  
Ironically, even though he spent years in Washington as a lobbyist, congressional aide, 
and Nixon administration appointee, Bennett managed to cast himself as an outsider, a 
businessman ready to shake up the Washington establishment. 2 
With Bennett lacking a voting record, the general election became a referendum 
on Owens and Congress.  As a result, several key issues came to the forefront.  In 
particular, the House banking scandal plagued Owens’ campaign.  On October 2, 1992, 
just one short month before the general election, the Justice Department publicly 
announced it would not investigate his case for lack of evidence of criminal wrongdoing.  
This had been the Owens’ official campaign position from the start, but so much time had 
elapsed that many voters had already implicated him in the embarrassing event.  Bennett 
effectively exploited the issue, pointing out that his campaign polling indicated 78 
percent of Utahns associated Owens with the scandal. More importantly, it reminded 
voters of their distrust of the federal government and reinforced the anti-Washington 
message that resonated so well in the 1992 election cycle.  If Owens had not been 
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sufficiently tied to the Washington establishment before, the House banking scandal 
cemented the link in the public’s mind. 3      
Meanwhile, the Owens campaign attempted to remind voters of Bennett’s ties to 
Washington primarily through his connections to the Watergate scandal two decades 
before.  In 1992, speculation still swirled around the identity of Deep Throat, the 
scandal’s chief informant to Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl 
Bernstein.  Bennett had close ties to important players in the event and was suspected to 
be the anonymous Deep Throat.  He owned a public relations firm that functioned as a 
front for the Central Intelligence Agency.  One of his employees, Howard Hunt, 
organized the Watergate break-in.  Bennett had an established relationship with 
Woodward, and he previously held a prominent position with the Nixon Administration.  
The former president allegedly suggested that Bennett could be the unknown informant.  
Only years later would Deep Throat’s true identity be unveiled as former FBI agent Mark 
Felt.4 
From the moment Bennett announced his candidacy, his campaign understood 
that Watergate issue would come into play.  More than a full year before the general 
election, a campaign consultant wrote to Bennett addressing this issue: “You have 
Watergate baggage which at the very least ties you into an ‘old politics;’….Unless you 
can generate an anti-Owens vote, make people forget your age and baggage, you will lose 
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to Wayne in the general election.”5  The Bennett campaign expected an attack regarding 
the Watergate connection with campaign memos circulating titled, “Watergate 
Inoculation.”6  Rather than bring up the issue, Bennett chose to wait it out.  No such 
formal attack took place in the GOP convention or primary, but in explaining possible 
reasons for a poor convention showing, one Bennett campaign consultant pointed to 
Watergate.  “As much as I hate to admit it, Republican delegates are a suspicious lot, and 
just the talk about Watergate unsettled many of them.”7  No polling confirmed this 
conclusion, but the prospect of Watergate attacks clearly unsettled the Bennett campaign 
from the very beginning.     
Owens came into the general election as an underdog who needed to do 
something dramatic or lose the election convincingly.  Owens held a place in Watergate’s 
history having voted to impeach Nixon while serving on the House Judiciary Committee.  
In reference to Bennett’s involvement in Watergate, Owens told a reporter: “He’s been an 
insider in the worst sense of the word for much longer than I’ve been an insider in the 
best sense of the word—as an elected representative.”8  The painting of Bennett as an 
insider involved in Watergate was especially critical in a year when so many distrusted 
the Washington establishment.  One Democratic strategist said at the time, “People are 
searching for someone who’s an outsider.  Somebody who isn’t tied in to politics as 
usual.  And here you have Bennett, who’s connected to the most damaging political 
scandal of the century.”9  Owens produced a commercial on the subject saying, “His TV !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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commercials claim he’s an outsider, but for nearly ten years, Bob Bennett was a 
Washington lobbyist.”10  Initially, the ads resonated among voters.  Bennett recalled, “It 
was beginning to get some traction, and the polls started to narrow a little, ours as well as 
theirs.”11   
In a letter to Howard Baker, former senator and ranking member of the U.S 
Senate Watergate Committee, Bennett admitted that the Owens attacks hurt his 
campaign.  Bennett implored Baker: 
Should the Utah or Washington based media make contact with you it would be 
imperative to my success that you confirm without equivocation that the accusations 
made against me all came from individuals who were subsequently convicted of 
perjury, and that each and every investigation into those allegations fully and 
completely exhonerated [sic] me of any direct or indirect involvement in the Watergate 
matter.12   
 
Baker did as instructed, providing signed letters to the Bennett camp that were later 
shared with reporters.  Even with this testimonial, the issue persisted for Bennett.  The 
successful rebuttal to the argument came from Owens himself.  During a radio interview 
early in the campaign, a reporter asked Owens what he thought about Bennett’s 
involvement in the Watergate scandal.  Owens responded, “No, I don’t think Bob Bennett 
played a major role in Watergate.”  Months later when these allegations resurfaced, 
Bennett created a commercial where he refuted the claims of involvement in Watergate.  
At the end of the commercial, he pressed play on a tape recorder that repeated Owens’ 
words three times, “No I don’t think Bob Bennett played a major role in Watergate.”  
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With Owens’ voice refuting the attacks, the issue largely subsided.  Bennett remained an  
outsider in the minds of many voters, a tremendous asset in the 1992 election.13      
Environmental issues also made Owens politically vulnerable, particularly with 
voters in the rural counties who deplored his advocacy of expanded wilderness 
legislation.  In setting forth a campaign strategy, the Congressman expected the issue to 
take center stage in a Cannon-Owens general election showdown.  “This is perhaps the 
only state in the nation this year where environmental issues are pivotal,” he said.  
“People want attention paid to the environment - to clean up the air, the second-worst in 
the country, to clean up and keep clean the water.”14 The unexpected Bennett victory 
surprised Owens.  In the Owens campaign headquarters, a poster of Cannon’s steel plant 
surrounded by pollution hung on the wall.  A Deseret News reporter described Owens 
supporters publicly cheering for Cannon as results of the back-and-forth Republican 
primary streamed into the building on election night.  If Cannon won, Owens’ 
environmental record would remind voters of their concerns over poor air quality.  After 
the election, Bennett discussed the election with Owens.  “I was so sure that Joe Cannon 
was going to be my opponent.  I had a whole campaign to go after Joe and Geneva,” 
Bennett remembers Owens saying.15  Bennett’s victory eliminated much of Owens’ 
political gain on the issue while still keeping all its liabilities.16   
A campaign strategist outlined Bennett’s position on the environment: “I think 
you need to be strong on clean air and water…while opposing wilderness.  In other 
words, separate environmental and land-use issues.  Environmentalism plays well along !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the Wasatch Front, while multiple use on the public lands keeps the rural counties in your 
camp against Owens.”17  While attempting to understand how Bennett performed so well 
in urban Utah County during the primary election, a campaign consultant pointed to the 
same issue:  
In particular, the Republican primary vote in Utah County should be looked at.  The 
even split there was a surprise to everyone, and there is a possibility that it was the 
result of environmentalist activism.  If so, and if that activism can be mobilized against 
you, that is another part of a potential 50% coalition [for Owens].18   
 
In reality, “environmental activism” in the county was attributable to anti-pollution 
sentiments directed at Cannon and his steel plant.  Transferring that anger onto another 
Republican like Bennett largely failed.   
Bennett showed support for the environment while distancing himself from many 
of the goals of the environmental community.  In a campaign brochure, he outlined this 
position:  
Bob says everyone is - or should be - an environmentalist, because the long-term 
effects of ignoring environmental problems can be devastating as the long-term effects 
of ignoring the deficit.  However, he believes that the measuring rod we should use in 
deciding which proposals to support is whether or not they benefit people, as well as 
plants and animals.19  
 
Bennett attempted to claim the mantle of environmental steward in the GOP primary.  
Now, facing an environmentalist, Bennett tried to reverse course and argue against the 
broader goals of the environmental movement.  These campaign documents highlight the 
line that the Bennett campaign tried to walk between job creation and environmental 
responsibility.     
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Rather than run from the issue, Owens fully embraced the environment, even if it 
cost him dearly in rural areas.  “A radical environmentalist I am…I don’t think I could 
get elected dog catcher in Southern Utah,” Owens said, a quote quickly repeated by 
Republicans.20  In his 1984 gubernatorial race, Owens beat his Republican challenger in 
four rural counties while splitting the vote in another five.  The 1992 race was a different 
story.  Despite persistent opposition, Owens did not shy away from his support of 
expanded wilderness legislation.  "Most of the state is catching up with me on 
environmental issues," he said at the time.21  The final vote tally between the candidates 
indicated that Utah voters never caught his vision.   
To help support his environmental arguments, Owens made a direct appeal to 
religion in a campaign mailer regarding wilderness.  Candidates can craft a message that 
will resonate with a Mormon audience by utilizing a well-placed word or cue.  In defense 
of environmental legislation, Owens pointed out that many Utahns supported wilderness, 
the sticking point was how much.  A Bureau of Land Management study recommended 
the designation of 1.9 million acres as wilderness, while environmentalists wanted a 
much larger figure.  Owens pushed a bill that would designate five million acres of the 
state to wilderness.  In response to outraged Utahns, Owens briefly turned to Mormon 
practice to defend his position.  He said, “About ten percent of Utah’s land would be 
preserved as wilderness if [my bill] is passed, a tithe to our future and to our children who 
will never have to wonder what sort of grandeur we once lived with in Utah.”22  This did 
not impress Mormons in the Utah backcountry.  Following the election, Owens offered !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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an explanation: “Our [Mormon] doctrine is enormously progressive toward the 
environment, but our cultural interpretation has not followed suit.  Our theology has not 
translated politically into a powerful environmental ethic.”23 
Reference to religion in Utah came with risks.  When Bennett had two high-
profile Democrats publicly endorse his candidacy over Owens, a draft copy of the 
newspaper advertisement mentioned their Mormon religious affiliation.  A letter from 
one of the two asked that Bennett delete the Mormon references.  His reasoning: “My 
experience is that explicit reference to L.D.S. service in political campaigns can 
backfire.”24  When used overtly, religious references can often turn voters away from a 
particular candidate.  
If focused on the environment, Owens was well aware of Mormon social 
conservatism.  Sensitive to voters’ concerns, he bucked the national party on moral 
issues.  Still, he miscalculated as a campaign fundraising brochure severely damaged him 
with voters.  Intended for an out-of-state audience, the brochure proudly set forth the 
liberal voting agenda of the congressman, particularly on social issues.  A Bennett staffer 
stumbled upon the Owens fundraising brochure with its title taken from a quote by 
Senator Orrin Hatch: “If you send Wayne Owens back there, every vote I cast is going to 
be canceled, virtually every vote.”25  The brochure listed his support of abortion, gun 
control, national defense cuts, and gay rights.  Bennett quickly attacked Owens, making 
100,000 copies of the brochure and distributing them across the state.  The appearance of 
dishonesty hurt Owens, especially as he seemingly offered two contradictory messages to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 “Utah Quotes,” Salt Lake Tribune, 27 June 1993.  
24 Daniel L. Berman to Bob Bennett, 19 October 1992, Bennett collection. 
25 “If you send Wayne Owens back there, every vote I cast is going to be canceled, virtually every vote,” 




different audiences.  Worse, his self-portrayal as a social liberal hurt him in the morally 
conservative state. 
Owens drew support from unions, but Utah’s labor movement had little influence 
in political contests.  In 1955, the state passed strict right-to-work laws that significantly 
hampered the labor movement.  In addition, the LDS Church publicly supported national 
right-to-work legislation in 1965, further stigmatizing unions in the state.  One Bennett 
campaign memo stated, “We can expect Owens, with his labor union support, to have an 
effective phone bank turnout effort.”26  Beyond this, Bennett displayed little concern for 
the organizing power of unions.  In debate preparations, Bennett staffers urged him to 
remind voters of his opponent’s connection to organized labor.  Quoting from a National 
Right to Work Newsletter’s talking points: “Owens has been one of Big Labor’s most 
reliable water carriers in Congress.”27  A weak labor movement and strong anti-union 
sentiment doubly harmed Owens.28 
Traditionally, Owens relied upon his personal strengths and character to carry him 
in an otherwise unfriendly political environment.  “Utahns don’t throw people out of 
office who they like and have confidence in,” Owens said.29  Others remember his affable 
personality.  “He was a very charming man,” Jones recalled.  “He had a great way of 
speaking that was disarming, self-deprecating, humorous and people liked him, even if 
they didn’t like his politics, they liked him….His personality seemed to fit Utah pretty 
well.”30  As the race began, nonpartisan polling found that 22 percent of Republicans 
preferred the Democrat Owens in the contest.  “Wayne always believed in his ability to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Memorandum from Gordon Jones, 10 September 1992. 
27 Campaign memorandum to Bob Bennett, 24 October 1992, Bennett collection. 
28 Rogers, 11-12. 
29 Bob Bernick Jr., “4 Utah Senate Candidates Try to Stand Apart,” Deseret News, 20 July 1992. 




sit down with somebody one-on-one and persuade them to support him,” Jones said.31  
While this strategy worked in his district, and to a certain degree in his earlier statewide 
races, his likeable personality could not overcome the significant party identification gap 
that existed between Democrats and Republicans.32   
Besides his Republican Party identification, Bennett’s greatest strength in the 
campaign was voters’ perceptions of him as a political outsider.  A campaign memo 
offered a reason for Owens’ predicament. “In some respects it is inevitable that a sitting 
Member of Congress becomes part of the Washington Establishment.  Only a very few 
escape the trap.”33  Bennett happily accepted this, making sure voters identified Owens 
with an unpopular Congress.  A Bennett campaign memo strategized: “The issue is how 
to remind the voters of Owens’ negatives without causing a real backlash of sympathy for 
Owens.”  The memo continued:   
THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION IS TO IDENTIFY OWENS WITH THE 
THINGS ABOUT CONGRESS AS A WHOLE THAT THE VOTERS SO 
INTENSELY DISLIKE.  IN DOING THAT YOU ACTUALLY CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST THE CONGRESS AS A WHOLE, AND NOT OWENS PERSONALLY.34   
Bennett had his personal punching bag in Congress, attacking it (and by proxy his 
opponent) without risking voter backlash.   
In addition to party identity, Bennett benefitted from important demographic 
changes in the state.  Following national trends, the 1980s saw a major shift in population 
away from urban centers to booming suburban communities.  Such suburbs in Davis and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Jones interview. 
32 Bob Bernick Jr., “Owens, Cannon Open Wide Leads,” Deseret News, 14 March 1992; Quin Monson and 
Thad Hall, “Elections in Utah: A Perspective with Data” (presentation, Utah Governor’s Commission on 
Election Reform, Salt Lake City, UT, April 2009). This presentation showed that in 1992 Utahns identified 
themselves with the GOP by a 53-33 margin over Democrats.   
33 Memorandum from Gordon Jones, no date, Bennett collection. 




Salt Lake Counties grew by 28 and 17 percent respectively in the 1980s. Utah suburbs, 
unlike its urban cores, became Republican strongholds.  Salt Lake City suburbs like 
Bountiful, Layton, and Centerville disproportionately attracted white men and women 
who affiliated with the Mormon Church.  Meanwhile, Democratic areas in urban centers 
lost population or were stagnant.  Salt Lake City’s white, non-Hispanic population 
dropped an estimated eight percent in the twenty years from 1970-1990. Devoted 
religiously and situated in large families, these Utahns rallied to conservatives, who 
preached traditional values and railed against feminists, gays, and liberals.  On election 
day, they voted a straight Republican ticket.  The census tracked the growth of these 
burgeoning suburbs.  So, too, did savvy politicians.  Democrats were not only on the 
defensive ideologically, the numbers were also against them.35  
Suburban Davis County overwhelmingly supported Bennett in the 1992 race with 
a nearly two-to-one margin.  Owens lost the county during his first Senate race in 1974, 
but by a smaller margin.  More importantly, the total number of voters in the county 
increased 136 percent during those 18 years.  While Owens lost the U.S. Senate race by 
approximately 25,000 votes in 1974, he lost Davis County alone by 21,000 votes in the 
1992 contest.  Figure 2 shows the dramatic increase in population of Davis County, one 
of Salt Lake’s largest suburban areas, compared with the city’s decline.  The bulk of 
support for Utah Democrats came from Salt Lake City and the state’s other urban centers.  
The move since the early 1970s to the Republican Party is in direct relationship to the rise  
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Figure 2. Population by Decade 
 
 
of suburban communities.36 
In the final vote tally, Bennett defeated Owens, 420,069 to 301,228, a 16 percent 
margin of victory.  Rural counties overwhelmingly sided with Bennett.  Even Garfield 
County, Owen’s rural home, delivered a convincing 60 percent victory for Bennett.  
Suburban areas delivered a hard blow to Owens.  Salt Lake County, a mix of urban and 
suburban precincts, narrowly went to Bennett.  In all, Bennett won all but three of the 
state’s 29 counties.  Owens’ third try at a statewide race ended more disastrously than 
ever.  Each candidate brought vulnerabilities to the election, but more importantly, the 
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Democratic label was too burdensome to overcome for Owens in an increasingly 
conservative Utah.37 
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RISE OF CONSERVATISM AND FALL OF LIBERALISM 
 
 
The career of Wayne Owens offers much insight into Utah’s changing political 
landscape. In the 11 major elections held between 1972 to 1992, Owens was a candidate 
in seven of them (four times for the House of Representative, twice for Senate, and once 
for governor).  Of particular usefulness are his three unsuccessful runs at statewide office.  
In each successive campaign, Owens drew a smaller share of the vote.  He narrowly lost 
to Senator Jake Garn by six percent in 1974, the 1984 gubernatorial race by 12 percent, 
and the 1992 Senate contest by 16 percent.  In 1972 during his first run for Congress, 
Democrats held the governorship, majorities in both houses of the state legislature, and 
every congressional seat except one U.S. Senate seat.  A short 20 years later, Republicans 
controlled both state legislative bodies, both Senate seats, and one of the state’s three 
congressional seats.  One political commentator said it best: “When [Owens is] up, the 
party soars. When he crashes, the party becomes catatonic. For the past two decades, he's 
been the party's litmus test.”1  The sad reality for Utah Democrats is that over time the 
crashes became more frequent and their toll more severe.2  
A profound shift occurred in Utah politics in the last decades of the twentieth 
century as conservative Republican voters increased significantly to outnumber 
Democrats.  Key to this was a broad ranging reaction to cultural and social change 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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hatched in the 1960s and early 1970s.  Conservatives preached what commentators have 
called the “social issue” to mobilize a coalition of groups in opposition to liberalism and 
the Democratic Party.  Denounced as the party of abortion, gay rights, and feminism, 
Democrats lost ground and the balance of power shifted right and to the Republican 
Party.  In tune with Utah’s Mormon majority, conservatives championed the traditional 
family, life, and national security.  Democratic erosion accelerated as the messages of 
Mormon leaders resonated with Republican politicians.  For many Mormons, it was 
impossible to be a Democrat and a faithful Mormon simultaneously.  
Beyond the ideological, Democratic misfortune was apparent in the electoral 
math. The 1992 Senate election provides an ideal moment to analyze this.  Republican 
primary voters outnumbered Democrats 263,639 to 120,746, more than a two-to-one 
advantage for the GOP.  Most telling is that the losing Republican candidate Joe Cannon 
received more votes than the two Democratic candidates combined.  As more voters 
identified as Republicans, Democratic electoral chances disappeared. 3    
The Republicans looked to the suburbs as their heartland and turned their backs 
on the citizens of the urban centers of Utah.  There was little risk to this strategy.  The 
1990 census revealed significant development in suburban communities coupled with 
stagnation in the state’s urban cities.  In combination with the rural counties, the rapidly 
growing suburban precincts were brimming with white Mormons living in traditional 
families.  Utah’s suburban growth helped solidify conservative gains in the state.  
Demographic variables only enhanced ideological trends.4 
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Owens and other Utah Democrats hoping to win a statewide race realized that 
putting together a winning coalition had become nearly impossible.  An interoffice memo 
from the Bennett campaign explains this political reality: 
It is just not possible for [Owens] to put together a coalition totalling [sic] 50%, barring 
some major goof on our part.  The base Democrat vote in the State is roughly 35%.  In 
1974, Owens came with [sic] 5,000 votes of Jake Garn running statewide, but in those 
days the Democratic Party was only beginning its suicide, and the base vote was 
substantially higher.  Assuming Owens gets all of the 35% (which he won’t), he needs 
to find another 15%.  Republican environmentalists?  At most 5%.  Pro-choice 
Republican women?  At most 2%.  He might get to 40%, by some legerdemain to 45%, 
but that’s the top.5 
 
The prognostication proved accurate as Owens garnered 40 percent in the general 
election.  Since that time, no Democrat has earned more than 33 percent of the popular 
vote in a U.S. Senate election in the state.   
With such a scenario, the entire emphasis of a GOP campaign is focused on 
winning the Republican nomination.  While most campaigns ramp up staff following a 
primary election, a Bennett consultant suggested the opposite strategy: “We should be 
able to cut the present staff by 50%.”6  After Bennett won the primary, a senior staff 
member circulated a memo encapsulating this point.  “Your campaign team has done a 
solid job, and there is every reason to think that they will be able to continue the effort 
through the general election.  As [the campaign manager] says, it’s on auto-pilot.”7  
Without any significant competition from the Democrat Party, most Republicans simply 
coast to the finish line.  
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 The Bennett advertising strategy, so critical to his success in the Republican 
primary, changed focus heading into the general election.  A campaign memo revealed 
this shift in priorities: 
Your media campaign should essentially ignore Owens.  It should continue the 
‘change’ and ‘reform Congress’ themes, but in my opinion you should soften your 
image, using footage of you strolling around the yard in a sweater, walking your 
grandson, with your own voice-over: ‘This is why I want to change Congress, reform 
the process, limit terms, etc.’ That kind of stuff.  Footage of you interacting with 
different kinds of people will blur some of the hard edges people perceive on you 
now.8 
 
Going from an aggressive campaign strategy to wearing a sweater and walking around 
the yard with a grandchild is a tectonic shift in advertising strategy in just a few short 
weeks.  Democrats shared this reality.  “As I look back on that election, I had a real clear 
feeling as early as March that this was not going to go well,” Owens’ campaign manager 
recalled.  “I felt like we could probably win the nomination, but somebody was going to 
have to screw up really badly for us to win.”9  These considerations underscore the 
political vulnerability of Democrats, especially in an increasingly conservative Utah. 
 Recognizing this problem, Owens distanced himself from the Democratic label.  
In a campaign press release, he said, “Bob Bennett has purposely overlooked the fact that 
I am a different kind of Democrat.”10  His chief of staff echoed this problem.  “There was 
a perception that he was too liberal to win a statewide race,” she recalled.11  Recognizing 
the liability of the Democratic label, Owens attempted to show his independence of the 
national party, particularly on issues unpopular with the state electorate.  “‘The Wayne 
Owens of ‘72 and ‘74 was more of an ideological purist,’ he conceded.  ‘The Wayne !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Ibid. 
9 Jones interview. 
10 “Owens Defends Senator Garn’s Record of Fiscal Responsibility.” Campaign Advertisement for Wayne 
Owens, Bennett collection. 




Owens of ‘86 is more practical.  I know there’s a need to balance budgets and to balance 
environmental concerns.’”12  Owens recognized that a Democrat in denial was the only 
palatable option for many Utah voters. 
The 1992 election was the last stand of Wayne Owens and the Democrats in U.S. 
Senate races in Utah.  Owens never again ran for office.  Democratic Senate candidates 
have fallen by an average of 30 percent of the vote since the 1992 election with this 
particular race revealing the power of two tidal forces.  In the 1960s and 1970s, Utahns 
made an ideological shift to the right around the social issues of family, God, and guns 
and against gays, abortion, and women’s rights.  By 1992, a conservative consensus had 
been reached on these issues with voters overwhelmingly siding with the GOP.   
Republican candidates did not question this common wisdom, vouching for their 
conservative credentials in the primary campaign.  In addition to this ideological shift, a 
suburbanization of electoral power occurred as racially and religiously homogenous 
communities voted as blocs for Republican conservatives.  This demographic 
transformation shattered traditional voting trends with conservatives the overwhelming 
beneficiaries.  Without a major demographic shift or a national crisis that shatters party 
identities and loyalties, Democrats will have little hope for success and Republicans little 
fear of failure.13 
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